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1. Introduction 
    
1.1 Context/Background 
 
Everyday people rely on communications from within their vehicle, through cell 
phone use, radio, global positioning or remote assistance. There seems to be limitless 
forms of communications giving reason to create and explore the boundaries of each. One 
avenue of communications currently being explored is inter-vehicle communications. The 
primary benefit of this technology is that it could improve safety by issuing traffic and 
weather warnings, or even provide notification of an impending collision.  Wireless 
Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [1] is a developing set of standards that 
governs wireless communications between vehicles. As with any new standard, there are 
open issues that need to be solved. One such issue is the ability to track a vehicle over 
time and space [2]. This vulnerability arises from the WAVE standard’s broadcast 
messages. A proposed solution to address this problem is an augmentation to the WAVE 
standard. Secure Anonymous Broadcasting (SAB) [3] creates certificate based security 
which allows for anonymous broadcasting. Naturally this augmentation comes with 
additional issues to tackle. One such issue is the topic of this paper. 
 
1.2 Definition of the problem 
 
  The SAB protocol creates certificate based security within a vehicular network. 
Certificate based security has several requirements including: dissemination, 
authorization, and revocation to name a few. It is important to have a strong system for 
revocation of certificates to maintain trust within the network. To accomplish this, a 
means of detecting anomalies in the network and assess trustworthiness must exist. There 
are many scenarios that require the detection of anomalies to ensure security and safety of 
the network. There must also be a means of detecting those who would subvert the 
security of the network for their own use.  
A security threat that has been identified to WAVE is known as location spoofing 
[2]. SAB does not provide a solution to this threat, thus requiring further security 
measures. This threat is minor, but detection of this type of manipulation is important. It 
provides a first line of defense against attacks. For example, if someone intended to 
attempt a more sinister attack, it would first be prudent to hide their own location. 
The problem that this paper addresses is a method of determining if a vehicle 
within a WAVE/SAB network is spoofing its location. 
 
 
 
 1.2 Summary of the Results 
 
  The findings of this paper give a description of revocation rules designed to 
prevent location spoofing as well as a detailed account of three possible schemes for 
anomalous position report detection. 
 
1.3 Overview of the Report 
 
The background information about the network and an introduction to the 
revocation scheme using anomalous position report detection are in Section 2. The setup 
for the simulation environment is described in Section 3. The results of the project are 
presented in Section 4. A discussion of the results and an evaluation of each solution are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, future work and the conclusion are presented in Section 6. 
 
  
2. Detailed Background & Setup 
 
2.1 Revocation 
 
  Detection of falsified reports is required in order to facilitate certificate 
revocation. This is accomplished by a series of rules which can identify a falsified 
position report. These rules require storage of each vehicle’s past position report. A 
position report consists of a location, a direction, and a speed. This information is used to 
detect if a vehicle can be where it claims. 
First, there must be a check to make sure that a reported location, received by a 
Road Side Unit (RSU) [1] is within the range of that RSU. If the vehicle is reporting a 
location that is not within the RSU’s range, then that RSU should not be receiving the 
message. 
  Next, the RSU has to check if the current location of a vehicle is plausible given 
its previous location, direction, and speed. The RSU has to store this set of values for 
each vehicle and check them periodically using a set of plausibility rules to detect the 
truth of each position report. There must be some mechanism for creating an area 
bounding the possible location of a vehicle in a given amount of time. 
 
2.2 Anomalous Position Report Detection 
 
  The objective of the anomalous position report detection mechanism is to 
calculate a tight area bounding the vehicle’s future location, given its present speed, 
direction, and acceleration.   
  There are many different approaches to this problem. One approach suggests 
using both acceleration and direction as a constant, by using infinitely small periods of 
time between evaluations of position reports.  
 Another  alternate  approach  is to use a very large period of time, and produce a 
large and encompassing anomalous position report boundary for the vehicle’s location.   Finally, the approach this paper takes is somewhere between these two extremes. 
We create a tight upper bound at a useful interval of time. This approach is both practical 
and useful for our purpose. 
I used OGRE to create a simulation of a car moving in a planar world with the 
three models for anomalous position report detection. OGRE (Object-Oriented Graphics 
Rendering Engine) is a scene-oriented, flexible 3D engine written in C++. 
 
4. Result 
  
We have created a simulation that illustrates the movement of a vehicle as well as 
the graphical representation of a bounded anomalous position report detection model. The 
anomalous position report boundary is updated when the vehicle reports its location, 
speed, and direction. This gives us a visual test to see if the vehicle stays within the 
boundary. In our model, the previous position report’s boundary is green coloured, while 
the current position’s boundary is white.  To find the most effective boundary, three 
models for anomalous position report detection are assessed. 
  The first model uses the current speed as an indicator of the maximum distance a 
vehicle could travel.  
 
 
Fig.1. Semi-Circle Boundary for Current Position (White) 
 
Using a semi-circle to represent this bound, the bound grows at a constant rate 
relative to the speed being traveled. As shown in Figure 1. 
  The second model, based on the first, uses present speed and acceleration to 
calculate the boundary. This also has a semi-circle representing the bound, growing and 
shrinking its radius with the current speed and acceleration of the vehicle. 
  The third model is much more complex than the first two. It is based on the polar 
equation of r = 1 + cos θ. This model produces a shape, which looks something like a 
heart, called a cardioid, as seen in Figure 2. 
  
Fig. 2. Cardioid. [5] 
 
 
The simulator’s use of the equation is such: 
 
))) ( 1 /( ( * )) cos( * 1 ( ax percentOfM abs speed abs ax percentOfM r + Θ + =  
 
Where percentOfMax equals the decimal percentage of the maximum obtainable 
speed of the vehicle and speed equals the current speed plus the acceleration of the 
vehicle. The part of the equation in the first set of brackets creates the boundary’s shape 
which is dependant on the current speed. The second part of the equation scales the 
boundary accordingly. 
  This creates a circle around the vehicle when it is stopped as seen in Figure 3. 
  
Fig. 3. Circle Around Car Using the Third Model 
 
   As it accelerates, the circle elongates in front and shrinks behind the vehicle in 
one smooth motion as seen in Figure 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Cardioid In Front of the Car Using the Third Model 
 This creates a situation where the car cannot slow down and then reverse fast 
enough to leave the boundary behind it. 
  One problem faced is, how to test each model without having human interaction 
skew any results. A macro program is employed to take the human factor out of the 
equation. Using a set of predetermined random turns at random intervals for each model 
should compare them on equal ground.  
 
5.  Evaluation of the Result 
 
  Using the macro (see Appendix) to drive the simulator for each of the three 
models, the following results were obtained. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Success  232 293 275 
Failure  61 0 18 
Table 1. Results from simulator driven by macro. 
  
Each success of a model means that a location report was within the boundary that 
it created, and a failure indicates that the location report was outside of that boundary. 
Since the model is attempting to bound normal driving practices, we are trying to have a 
maximum amount of successes, and minimum amount of failures. That is to say that with 
normal driving, the number of times a model will wrongly detect an anomalous report is, 
the number of failures divided by the total number of reports. The model with the 
smallest number of false positives is preferred. 
The first model has proven to be insufficient in detecting anomalous position 
reports. If, within the time between reports, a vehicle is (on average) accelerating, then 
the boundary fails to contain the vehicle’s location. 
 
   
Fig. 5. Simulator Demonstrating the First Model. 
 
The reported location and corresponding boundary (green) has been exceeded by 
the accelerating car. This will continue as long as the car continues to accelerate. Any 
time the vehicle accelerates, we fail to predict a boundary for its location. This is an 
unacceptable result because vehicles are expected to accelerate and decelerate often in the 
real world and should not be reason for certificate revocation. Since this model’s failure 
rate is be quite high as seen in Table 1, it is insufficient to use for this revocation scheme. 
The second model works much better than the first. It allows the vehicle to 
accelerate and remain within the bound. This model suits quite well for forwards and 
backwards motion, but it requires additional allowances to account for the transition 
between the two. This would be only a small source of error, occurring if someone was 
backing up, then moving forwards, or vise-versa. Since allowances have been made, it 
works with a one hundred percent success rate as shown in Table 1. 
The third and final model works the best of the three visually, but in testing it 
shows some problems. It is able to bound the vehicle while accelerating also while 
transitioning between forwards and backwards motion. It fails a very small percentage of 
the time and only while doing what would be considered extreme driving. They could be 
eliminated by increasing the size of the bound by a very small margin. 
 
 
6. Future Work & Conclusion 
 
  Anomalous position report detection forms a strong basis for detection and 
revocation of a vehicle attempting to falsify their location. A useful addition to this 
scheme would be a measure of trustworthiness for each vehicle. This would allow for a 
small margin of error in anomalous position report detection for variables in the real world that could not be simulated. Also the WAVE standard does not include messages 
containing speed, location and direction. A unique data structure would need to be 
developed for this purpose. An additional problem to explore is the requirements the 
RSUs will have to meet. Questions that need to be answered include: What is the optimal 
interval between reports? How many vehicles can an RSU keep track of at one time?  
This revocation scheme is such that it greatly reduces the potential for a location 
to be successfully spoofed. To ensure security and trust within the WAVE/SAB network, 
revocation of certificates must be possible to prevent those who would subvert it.  
Anomalous position report detection is a possible solution to prevent successful location 
spoofing. Given the results shown in this paper, revocation using the anomalous position 
report detection scheme will increase the overall security and reliability of the network. 
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Appendix 
 
Macro used for simulator testing. Written and run in ACTool [6]. 
 
//Honours Project Macro 
DELAY 1000 
MousePos 190, 780   //Move mouse to open simulator 
LEFTCLICK     //Click 
LEFTCLICK   //Double  click 
MousePos 760, 700   //Move Mouse to start simulator 
DELAY 4000   //Wait 4 seconds 
LEFTCLICK   //Click 
DELAY 3000   //Wait 3 seconds 
Keys 3     //Select the Mode 
//Start Driving 
Keydown WD 4000 
Keydown S 5000 
Keydown D 8000 
Keydown W 2000 
Keydown S 6000 
Keydown A 7000 
Keydown AS 3000 
Keydown D 2000 
Keydown WD 5000 
Keydown SD 9000 
Keydown W 10000 
Keydown A 8000 
Keydown WA 6000 
Keydown W 1000 
Keydown WD 11000 
Keydown AS 15000 
Keydown D 10000 
Keydown S 2000 
Keydown W 14000 
Keydown S 5000 
Keydown D 6000 
Keydown DS 4000 
Keydown WD 5000 
Keydown SD 9000 
Keydown W 10000 
Keydown A 8000 
Keydown WA 6000 
Keydown W 1000 
Keydown WD 11000 Keydown AS 15000 
Keydown W 2000 
Keydown S 6000 
Keydown A 7000 
Keydown AS 3000 
Keydown D 2000 
Keydown WD 5000 
Keydown SD 9000 
Keydown S 2000 
Keydown W 14000 
Keydown S 5000 
Keydown D 6000 
Keydown DS 4000 
Keydown WD 5000 
Keydown SD 9000 